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Abstract: After discussing the sources of funding of education in China this paper offers an 
explanation of the quantitative changes in education spending by the framework of demand 
analysis, including the changes in the ratio of educational funding to GDP in the period 1991-2002. 
Income effect is estimated mainly by using cross-provincial data, while time series data are used to 
estimate the price effect. Changes in government and non-government spending through time can 
be satisfactorily explained by the factors of demand. Demand for education services in the three 
levels of primary school, secondary school and higher education and aggregate demand for 
education services are investigated. Implications of our finding on inequality of education 
opportunities are briefly stated.  
1. Introduction 
 
A very striking fact in China’s economic history in the turn of the 21
st century is that the 
ratio of education funding to GDP increased from a mere 3.4 percent in 1997 to 5.2 
percent in 2002. Almost as striking is the rapid increase in the share of education funds 
outside of government appropriation from 24.8 percent in 1995, 31.7 percent in 1999 to 
36.3 percent in 2002. Are the increases in these ratios due to changes in government 
policy or to changes in conditions of demand for education? A main purpose of this paper 
is to demonstrate that factors affecting demand for education, namely real income and 
relative price, can explain the increases in these ratios. 
 
Since 1978 China’s economy has been transformed step by step from a planned economy 
to a market economy, as documented in the literature (see Chow, 2002). One aspect of 
this transformation is from the provision of educational services entirely by government 
institutions to one that is significantly financed by non-government sources. Figure 1 
presents the ratios of educational funds to GDP and of non-government funding for 
education to total educational funds according to China Statistical Yearbook (SYB) 2004 
(Tables 21-31 and 3-1). It shows that the ratio of educational funds to GDP was 3.38 
percent in 1991, remained approximately constant until it was 3.40 percent in 1997 and 
increased steadily to 5.21 percent in 2002. In the mean time, non-government funding as 
a fraction of total funding for education (defined narrowly as total funding minus 
“government appropriation” for education, a broader definition being total funding minus 
“government budgetary” funding) increased steadily from 15.5 percent in 1991 and 24.8 
percent in 1995 to 36.3 in 2002. See Figure 1 for these two ratios from 1999 to 2002. 
 
Figure 1 The Ratios of educational funds to GDP 






































































In section 2, we document the institutional transformation of the education system by 
describing the extent to which private funding of education has increased and exists 
today. It is often alleged that spending on education in China is the result of government 
  2policy. This statement is subject to two major qualifications. First, to the extent that 
educational expenditures are a part of total government expenditures, their total amount is 
limited by economic factors that affect total government revenue. Second, substantial 
parts of educational expenditures in China are financed by non-government sources that 
are affected by economic factors. Hence economic factors affect both government and 
non-government spending on education in China and elsewhere. We take the viewpoint 
that by 1991 the entry of new private schools has reached an equilibrium (meaning the 
completion of the initial development stage while new entries still continued) and that we 
can use the framework of demand analysis to explain the expenditures on education, in 
the aggregate and by the three levels of education. 
 
Taking the above viewpoint, we use in section 3 a demand function for educational 
services to explain the quantity of and total expenditure on education in each of the three 
levels of education. Market forces are found to be capable of explaining the amount of 
education provided to a large extent. We estimate income elasticity using observations 
across provinces in China and price elasticity by combining time-series and cross-section 
data. Both the quantity demanded as measured by school enrollment and total 
expenditure on education are explained. Government provision of education, though an 
important part of government policy, is treated as only one component in the demand for 
education, and its effect on the demand is evaluated. In section 4, the framework of 
section 3 will be applied to study the aggregate demand for all three levels of education 
combined, and its two components that are financed by government and non-government 
sources. In section 5, we comment briefly on the relation of income inequality and 
inequality in education opportunities in China. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Sources of Funding of Education in China 
 
In 1978, educational services at all levels of schooling were provided by the government. 
Since economic reform started, non-government schools have sprung up rapidly at all 
levels (see Chow (2002, pp. 355-6)). This has happened because the government has 
allowed it, partly to solve its budgetary problem in providing the amount of education 
desired, and because there was an increase in demand for educational services as income 
increased. The entry of new schools was quite free.  Non-government operated schools 
can be established and operated by social organizations or by a collection of individuals. 
Non-government or “people-operated” schools consist of two kinds, those established 
and operated by non-government institutions and those public schools turned over or 
leased to private operations. In the early 1980s it was easier for a social organization than 
for a private individual to establish and operate a school because it had land and 
buildings, financial capital, administrative personal and other forms of human capital, a 
legal status as well as social connections that were beneficial to the establishment and 
operation of a school. Defined broadly social organizations included all institutions other 
than government departments and government operated educational institutions. As the 
economy grew private citizens accumulated financial and other resources and began 
individually and collectively to establish schools at all levels. Often these non-
government operated schools received help in the form of land and capital from local 
  3governments that wished to improve the education of their own community.  
 
The development of a free market of education accelerated with Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern expedition in 1992 in which the paramount leader of China declared a policy of 
further opening of the Chinese economy to the outside world and urged the Chinese 
people to adopt market institutions to promote economic growth. This policy further 
encouraged the establishment of non-government financed educational institutions. 
Private funding for education also increased because government educational institutions 
began to collect more fees and tuitions. Thus “private funding” includes funding of the 
above two kinds of non-government operated schools and of government operated 
schools in the form of tuition and fees. The Chinese government encourages social 
organizations and private citizens to operate and finance schools at all levels, as stated in 
the 9
th Five-year Plan for 1995-2000 (section 2 of Chapter 5) and in the 10
th Five-year 
Plan for 2001-2005 (section 1 of Chapter 11 on the development of education). It has also 
increased the levy of tuition and fees in government-operated schools. 
 
It is the policy of the central government to assign the responsibility of providing the 
compulsory primary school and three years of middle school education to the local 
governments since it has not been able to finance it. Local governments have to find 
various ways to supply it, including the collection of fees and tuitions and the assignment 
of the operation to private citizens in the “people-run” but “government owned” public 
schools. There are also private schools that are operated by citizens in the name of social 
organizations or in their own names. Lin (1999, p. 8) states that in 1996 about 4 percent 
of the schools in China were private and that there were about 70,000 private schools. 
There were more if we include public schools that were given to private operation and 
financing. Both types of schools are “run by social forces in China.” The Regulation on 
Education Run by Social Forces, a State Council Degree No. 266 signed by Premier Li 
Peng on July 31, 1997, (see Lin, 1999, pp. 187-88), defines “social forces” as “any 
organization of enterprises or institutions, any social groups or other social organizations 
and any individual citizens that establish and run schools and other educational 
institutions … without using state educational funds (Article 2),” “The government 
encourages social forces to establish compulsory educational institutions to supplement 
the state-run compulsory education. (Article 5).”  
 
At the primary school level local governments in many poor villages were not able to 
finance the six years of compulsory education mandated by the central government and 
had to resort to the collection of tuitions and fees. At the middle school level the change 
in central government policy in 1994 to extend compulsory education from 6 to 12 years 
had a similar effect. At the level of higher education, since the middle 1990s the central 
government’s policy itself was changed to raising the amount of tuition charged to 
students year after year and encouraging the university staffs to obtain funding 
themselves by engaging in extra teaching, research and consulting activities as an 
extension of or outside the university. It also allows public universities to operate 
financially independent colleges or schools. For instance, a school of business 
administration of a university can establish a branch that offers a degree in business 
administration and that is financially independent, possibly charging a higher tuition than 
  4the regular tuition of the university. 
 
To recapitulate, the term “private funding” in China includes funds raised or spent by 
three types of schools: (1) public schools which are operated by government departments 
but charge tuition and fees, (2) public schools which are leased for private operation, or 
parts of which are operated and financed independently, and (3) private or non-
government schools. The schools in category (2) include financially independent colleges 
or schools that are set up by public universities or their affiliated units.  
 
The effect of privately operated schools on the educational system is to increase both the 
quantity of education services (number of students to be accepted) and the quality of 
education. The effect on quantity (number of students enrolled) is small in percentage 
terms, accounting for about 5 percent of total student enrollment. The effect on quality 
through competition can be substantial. For example a family in Shanghai can choose 
among several public and private schools for a child. Unlike the public school system in 
the US, a public school in a Chinese city has to compete with other public schools and 
private schools. These schools charge different tuitions. Public schools can choose not to 
accept students below different standards. Some public or private schools are known to 
be better and more difficult to enter. The market for the provision of educational services 
is free and competitive in the primary and secondary levels. Even at the university level 
competition exists because there are many privately operated universities. 
 
Total private funding is substantial as the following statistics show. Data on “educational 
funds” are provided in China Statistical Yearbook 2004 (see Table 21-31). The total 
funds are divided into “government appropriation for education” (a part of which is 
“budgetary”) and the remaining categories that include “funds of social organizations and 
citizens for running schools,” “donations and fund-raising for running schools,” “tuition 
and miscellaneous fees” and “other educational funds.” Since a part of “government 
appropriation” is non-budgetary and excluded from government expenditures, we can 
choose to define “non-government” education funding as total funding minus government 
budgetary funding, as we will later in this paper. The ratio of “educational funds” to GDP 
was 731.50/21617.8 or 3.38 percent in 1991, decreased to 3.06 percent in 1993, increased 
only slowly back to 3.40 in 1997 and then increased steadily to 3.76 in 1998, 4.08 in 
1999, 4.30 in 2000, 4.77 in 2001 and 5.21 in 2002. From 1998 to 2002, both “government 
appropriation” and the remainder increased substantially, the former from 2.59 to 3.33 
percent and the latter from 1.17 to 1.89 percent of GDP, but the latter increased 
proportionally more, by 61.5 percent as compared with 28.6 percent for government 
appropriation. The education funds to GDP ratio of 5.21 percent in 2002 is close to the 
average percentage of expenditures on educational institutions in 1999 for countries 
participating in the World Education Index Program and the OECD countries as reported 
in Financing Education – Investment and Returns prepared by UNESCO and OECD, 
2002, both being 5.5 percent (See Table 11, p. 183 of the report). In section 4 below we 
will attempt to explain the change in this percentage by estimating an aggregate demand 
function for education.  
 
Let us examine more closely the share of non-government funding of education. In 1999, 
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of total “expenditure on education.”  By contrast, China Statistical Yearbook 2003 Table 
20-35, p. 747, gives (3349.04-2287.18)/3349.04 or 31.71 percent as funding exclusive of 
government appropriation. Note that the UNESCO report includes as non-government 
funding “sources of funds for educational institutions after transfer from public sources” 
in its private sources. “Government appropriation” in China Statistical Yearbook may 
well include such transfers. If we define non-government funding as total funding minus 
the “budgetary” component of “government appropriation” the ratio of non-government 
to total funding for education in 1999 would be (3349.04-1815.76)/3349.04 or 45.8 
percent, which is close to the UNESCO figure of 44.7 percent. In the remainder of this 
section we wish to establish three propositions. (1) By official sources, the share of non-
government funding in China’s education system is substantial. (2) The share has been 
increasing steadily since 1991. (3) The share is underestimated by official sources.    
 
Propositions (1) and (2) are established simply by the data provided in SYB 2004, Table 
21-31, p. 804. In 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 respectively, total educational funds were 
731.5, 1877.95, 3349.04 and 5480.02 while the shares of non-government-appropriation 
funding were 15.5, 24.8, 31.7 and 36.3 percent respectively, showing both a substantial 
share and a steady increase in the share. In 1991, 1999 and 2002 respectively, the 
fractions of non-budgetary to total educational funds in China were 37.2, 45.8 and 43.2. 
These fractions can be considered as measures of the extent of private funding. 
 
The share of funding by the central government itself is much smaller. China Statistical 
Yearbook  2004 Table 21-32 shows that for 2002, of the total educational funds of 
54800278 (10000yuan) “budgetary” funds account for 56.8 percent. However, only 
3042307/31142383=9.77 percent of total “budgetary” funds are accounted for by the 
central government (the remaining 90.23 percent by local governments). Funding for all 
private schools is recorded as a part of non-budgetary funding of the local governments. 
The percentage of “budgetary” funds from the central government was smaller in 2002 
than in 2001. Although its own educational funding is small, the central government 
directs local governments to pay for education and regulates school fees charged by both 
local governments and by private schools.  Thus the policy of the central government can 
affect education funding substantially even when its own share is less than 6 percent of 
the total.  
 
On the proposition (3), official data on private funding of education underestimate its 
actual amount. These official data in SYB are stated as coming from the Department of 
Planning and Development of the Ministry of Education, but it is difficult for the 
Ministry to keep tract of the funding from all private sources. Even a college in a 
government university of which the first author serves on the Board of Trustees, namely 
Lingnan (University) College of Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, does not report to 
the Ministry of Education its very substantial funding from private sources that was used 
to construct over ten new buildings, to establish an endowment to support research by its 
faculty and to pay for visiting professors from abroad. An important source of 
underestimation is contributions from overseas Chinese and Chinese living in Hong 
Kong. The first author knows of several other specific cases of such funding totaling tens 
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National Statistical Bureau through the Ministry of Education. As another outside source, 
organizations such as the Chinese Economists Society and the Overseas Young Chinese 
Forum both registered in the United States and having several hundred members obtain 
their own funding to send scholars to lecture in China regularly. All such funding is not 
reported in Statistical Yearbooks but we have not come up with an accurate estimate of 
the amount of this underestimation. 
 
3. Demand Analysis of Three Levels of Educational Expenditure in China 
 
For each education level of regular primary school, regular secondary school and regular 
higher education we assume that the demand function has constant income elasticity and 
price elasticity. We first estimate the income elasticity  a  by using cross section data for 
provinces. Time series data will be used to estimate price elasticity b.  In section 4 we 
perform a similar analysis for total student enrollment in China. Before we proceed we 
wish to clarify the concept of demand in the present application of demand analysis. If all 
schools in China were private and all parents send their children to the private schools the 
concept of demand for education by Chinese families is clear and we can use real income 
and relative price as the two major explanatory variables. In the present application   
governments at all levels both demand and supply education services. On the side of 
demand we assume that real income and relative price are still the major determining 
factors as income affects government revenue and the ability to pay and relative price has 
the substitution effect. The fact that the government, or perhaps another part of it, 
happens to be the supplier of a part of total educational services does not invalidate the 
above conceptual framework of demand. As a supplier the government is subject to the 
constraint of a production function and the costs of the factors of production such as 
faculty time and services of school building and other education equipments. Once the 
conceptual framework of demand is clear we still face the problem of simultaneous 
equation bias if we use a single-equation approach to estimate price and income 
elasticities. This problem will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Let Qij denote student enrollment in school level  i  (i= 1, 2, 3) in province or 
municipality j  and  qij  be  Qij  divided by the population in province j. Let yj  be real GDP 
per capita in province j. Let fij  be the funding for education level  i  in province j (that 
includes both government and private funding) deflated by the consumer price index of 
province j and by population in province j. Table 1 provides data for cross-section 
analysis to estimate income elasticities of demand for the three levels of education. Under 
the simplifying assumption that the relative price of education is the same for different 
provinces the income elasticity of demand can be estimated by regressing ln fij on ln yj  
because ln fij is the sum of ln qij and ln pi (pi being the price or cost of education level i) 
which is a constant to be absorbed in the intercept of the regression. This simplifying 
assumption can be replaced by the weaker and more reasonable assumption that the 
relative prices of education may be different across provinces but are uncorrelated with 
provincial per capita income. Under this assumption the relative price variable would 
enter the regression of ln fij on ln yj  as an intercept plus a residual term that is added to 
the residual of the regression.  Using data for 2001 for thirty provinces excluding Beijing 
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estimated the above regression for each education level i and obtained the income 
elasticities  ai  at the three levels to be, with standard errors in parentheses,  1.2913 
(0.1738) for “regular institutions” of higher education, 0.8095 (0.0595) for secondary 
schools and 0.4172 (0.0913) for primary schools. These estimates of income elasticity 
would be unbiased if the residuals are uncorrelated with provincial income, which seems 
to be a reasonable assumption. The result indicates that income inequality in different 
provinces is reflected in inequality in the provision of education and that at the lower 
levels of education the opportunities of schooling are more equalized among different 
groups since the income elasticities are lower than for higher levels.  
 
Table 1  Cross Section Data for Estimating Income Elasticities of Demand 


















Beijing 1383  2845.65 103.1 173.7426 411.8193  279.4691
Tianjin 1004  1840.1 101.2 29.01817 196.5084  138.7214
Hebei 6699  5577.78 100.5 30.91984 568.5589  516.9546
Shanxi 3272  1779.97 99.8 15.42902 282.1993  275.2763
Mongolia 2377  1545.79 100.6 8.9449 198.2006  221.7992
Liaoning 4194 5033.08 100 50.16632 426.9275  357.9219
Jilin 2691  2032.48 101.3 30.00493 252.2105 266.5102
Helongjiang 3811  3561 100.8 43.92138 295.6441  305.5674
Shanghai 1614 4950.84 100 87.9929 573.8752  309.3251
Jiangsu 7355  9511.91 100.8 91.90611 991.0779  839.9106
Zhejiang 4613 6748.15 99.8 56.20513 863.0527  714.5375
Anhui 6328  3290.13 100.5 27.34042 403.2994  435.8699
Fujian 3440  4253.68 98.7 24.77333 429.4111  437.4424
Jiangxi 4186  2175.68 99.5 16.68792 306.6181  308.331
Shandong 9041  9438.31 101.8 49.58235 1002.519  710.7552
Henan 9555  5640.11 100.7 28.44927 644.8469  595.3073
Hubei 5975  4662.28 100.3 67.04464 538.0263  412.0719
Hunan 6596  3983 99.1 40.4015 556.169  490.5896
Guangdong 7783  10647.71 99.3 68.24383 1199.918  1373.49
Guangxi 4788  2231.19 100.6 14.44068 329.8354  406.7171
Hainan 796  545.96 98.5 4.13452 62.1809  76.735
Chongqing 3097  1749.77 101.7 25.03474 216.8854  230.2012
Sichuan 8640  4421.76 102.1 47.4993 566.3341  641.6841
Guizhou 3799  1084.9 101.8 8.64407 163.4009  270.6459
  8Yunnan 4287  2074.71 99.1 16.33944 293.642  451.5414
Tibet 263  138.73 100.1 1.10127 30.2557  50.2526
Shaanxi 3659  1844.27 101 53.23582 257.4927  291.5024
Gansu 2575  1072.51 104 14.30295 161.9951  213.0483
Qinghai 523 300.95 102.6 2.32423 42.3059  58.8424
Ningxia 563 298.38 101.6 3.28797 50.0358  60.3704
 
Data source: Total population, GDP, CPI: China Statistical Yearbook (2002), fund for high 
education, fund for secondary education, fund for primary education: China Educational Finance 
Yearbook (2002). 
 
We will combine the above estimates of income elasticity from cross-section data with 
time series data to estimate price elasticities. As pointed out by Friedman (1957) income 
elasticity estimated from cross-section data may not be equal to the estimate from time 
series data because the transitory components of income in the two sets of data may have 
different variances relative to the variances of permanent income. In the context of 
demand for education services in China we expect the transitory component of log 
provincial income to have a smaller variance relative to the variance of log permanent 
provincial income than the case for log real GDP observed through time. The latter is 
subject to short-run cyclical fluctuations. Although the levels of the former log income 
are also subject to cyclical fluctuations, when measured across provinces at one point in 
time, the cyclical components for all provinces may be nearly the same in percentage 
terms and affect only the intercept in a cross-section regression of log quantity on log 
income. If the non-cyclical components of transitory incomes across provinces are small, 
the income elasticity estimated from a cross-section regression is close to the long-run 
elasticity with respect to permanent income. It will be larger than the income elasticity 
estimated by time-series data alone since the log income data in time-series have a 
transitory component with a larger variance relative to the permanent component. 
 
We next discuss the problem of possible simultaneous-equation bias if the above 
estimated income elasticities are combined with time series data to estimate price 
elasticities. An income adjusted log quantity is defined as log quantity demanded minus 
the income elasticity times log income. If we regress log price on income adjusted log 
quantity, the regression coefficient will be an unbiased estimate of the inverse of price 
elasticity provided that the explanatory variable can be treated as exogenous. The 
assumption that the income adjusted log quantity is exogenous is based on the fact that 
the quantity of education services as measured by student enrollment is mostly given 
since the supply of such services depends on the capacity to produce it, namely the 
number of school teachers and the amount of physical facilities available, which cannot 
be changed materially within one year. The demand curve relating log price and log 
quantity has been shifted upward by the increase in income through the income effect.  
Together with a slowly changing supply this shift leads to increases in price as observed 
from the time-series data. Using log price as the dependent variable and income adjusted 
log quantity as the explanatory variable in a regression we can expect the residual to be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variable since it is uncorrelated with log quantity as 
explained above and there is no reason for it to be correlated with log income which 
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If both relative price of education and real income have a positive time trend, a lower 
income elasticity estimated from time series data alone as compared with the cross-
section estimate will be accompanied by a lower (in absolute value) price elasticity as 
compared with the elasticity estimated by imposing the higher cross-section income 
elasticity in the time series estimation for the following reason. Given the observed slow 
increase in the quantity demanded as measured by student enrollment and a rapid 
increase in real income, a higher income elasticity will shift the demand curve upward 
more, and, given the observed increase in relative price, it will require a larger price 
elasticity to slow down the quantity demanded to the supply level available. This larger 
price elasticity and the associated larger income elasticity estimated from cross-section 
data can explain the time trend of education services observed. We can interpret the 
elasticities obtained by combining time-series and cross-section data as long-run 
elasticities and the elasticities estimated from time-series data alone as short-run 
elasticities to the extent that the macro income variable has a transitory component with a 
larger variance relative to the variance of the permanent component than the provincial 
income variable in the cross-section data.    
 
For each level of education i we define the price  pit as the ratio of total government and 
non-government (meaning budgetary and non-budgetary) spending on education level i to 
its student enrollment in year t, further divided by the consumer price index to yield a 
relative price index per student at the corresponding level in year t. Define qit as total 
enrollment divided by population of the corresponding age group in school level  i  in 
year t, and yt as real GDP per capita in year t. Using annual time series data from 1991 to 
2002, we have attempted to estimate the price elasticity of demand for education in level  
i  by regressing ln pit on (ln qit - ai ln yt).  Using log price as the dependent variable is 
justified by our assumption that log quantity is predetermined to a large extent because 
school enrollment depends on the existing educational facilities which cannot be changed 
easily. As income increases in China the demand curve for education shifts upward but 
enrollment cannot be increased rapidly, leading to an increase in price as reflected in the 
data. We will provide a check for our estimates of price elasticity by using log quantity 
adjusted for income effect as the dependent variable and log price as the independent 
variable. This is our simple method to deal with the simultaneous equation bias in the 
estimation of price elasticity. The estimated regression coefficients are respectively 
0.4196 (.1494) for higher education, -3.2481(1.8703) for secondary schools, and –3.6281 
(0.9148) for primary schools. The corresponding price elasticities  bi  are the inverses of 
the above coefficients, namely  +2.38 for higher education, -0.3079 for secondary schools 
and -0.2756 for primary schools. (See regressions below.) The data for time series 
analysis are provided in Table 2. 




popprim popsec  pophigh GDP  per 
capita 
CPI Budgetary 
1991 115823  14097.377  12580.904 10395.8371 1879  170.8  4597308
  101992 117171  14516.556  12094.389 10243.9198 2287  181.7  5387382
1993 118517  15299.909  11631.708 9715.03049 2939  208.4  6443914
1994 119850  15838.968  11418.245 9299.71317 3923  258.6  8839795
1995 121121  16035.698  11669.298 8856.74391 4854  302.8 10283930
1996 122389  16644.139  11873.841 8275.40596 5576  327.9 12119134
1997 123626  16613.503  12013.549 7861.41756 6054  337.1 13577262
1998 124761  16438.214  12156.134 7632.06438 6038  334.4 15655917
1999 125786  15903.011  12628.819 7414.80886 6551  329.7 18157597
2000 126743  14914.294  13338.095 7527.316 7086  331  20856792
2001 127627  14142.819  13479.288 7947.61127 7651  333.3 25823762
2002 128453  13144.485  13980.097 8055.45447 8184  330.6 31142383
            
Year enrollh  enrolls  enrollp edufundh edufunds edufundp edufund 
 
1991 204.4  5226.8  12164.2 1507310.5 2021205.5 2306283.75  7315028
1992 218.4  5354.4  12201.3 1547467 2522117.6 3099381.9  8670491
1993 253.6  5383.7  12421.2 2214292.1 4070105.8 4830462.4  10599374
1994 279.9  5707.1  12822.6 2418589.3 4687452.25 5450420.3  14887813
1995 290.6  6191.5  13195.2 2622886.5 5304798.7 6070378.2  18779501
1996 302.1  6635.7  13615 3267929 6941063 7655924  22623394
1997 317.4  6995.2  13995.4 3904842 7676303 8349661  25317326
1998 340.9  7340.7  13953.8 5493394 8734432 9188468  29490592
1999 413.4  8002.7  13548 7087280 9818889 9939983.1  33490416
2000 556.1  8518.5  13013.3 9133504 11302022 10814443  38490806
2001 719.1  8901.4  12543.5 11665761.8 13863722.1 12740074.1  46376626
2002 903.4  9415.2  12156.7 14878590 16682290 14480218  54800278
Variable definition and data sources: popprim, popsec, pophigh: the sum of the population 
between 6-12 years old, 13-18 years old, 19 – 22 years old, respectively. Calculated based on 
Census 2000. Variables enrollh, enrolls, enrollp are the enrollments at the usual high education, at 
the usual secondary schools, and at the usual primary schools, respectively. These data together 
with GDP and CPI are from SYB 2003. Variables edufundh, edufunds, edufundp are the 
educational funds for the usual high education, for secondary schools, and for primary schools, 
respectively. Data before 1995 are collected (or calculated) from various years of China 
Educational Finance Yearbook, data for 1996 – 2002 are from China Statistical Yearbook, 1998 – 
2004. 
 
Table 3 Regressions for the Price Coefficients of High, Secondary and Primary Education 
 













   log(enrolls/popsec)-
0.81*log(real gdp/totpop) 
-3.248128 1.870364 










-3.628168  .9147713 







The low price elasticities of demand for secondary and primary education are reasonable. 
Since primary school education is compulsory, price affects the choice of schools and not 
total enrollment substantially (except in very poor region where compulsory education 
cannot be provided). For both primary and secondary school education, the Chinese 
parents appear to be willing to pay high tuition to get their children to good schools. 
Hence price elasticity can be expected to be low also. Partial evidence for low price 
elasticity can be found in the very large tuition (relative to the parents’ incomes) charged 
in private schools both in rich coastal areas and in poor rural areas.  
 
However the estimate of price elasticity for higher education has the wrong positive sign. 
One possible explanation for this unreasonable result is that demand for higher education 
is composed of two components, government and non-government, with each component 
determined by its own income and price variables. To explore this hypothesis, we have 
divided “total educational funds” for higher education into “government” and “non-
government” or the remainder, where “government” is defined as the “budgetary” part of 
“government appropriation.”  While the appropriate income variable for non-government 
demand is real GDP per capita y, the appropriate income variable for government 
demand is real government revenue per capita yg. The latter part of this statement is 
demonstrated by the regressions exhibited in Table 4 below. The price variable for the 
government component is pg  which equals government spending on higher education 
divided by total enrollment in higher education Qh ; the price variable pn for the non-
government component equals non-government spending on higher education divided by 
Qh. Under this hypothesis we regress demand for higher education on the income and 
price variables for government and non-government components as shown in the first 
regression of Table 4. The estimated coefficients indicate that income variables have 
positive and significance effects and price variables have negative effects on demand for 
high education.  
 
This regression shows that the government revenue elasticity of demand for higher 
education is 1.264 (with a standard error of .063); the GDP elasticity is 0.199 (.027), the 
price elasticity with respect to pg  is  -0.310 (.090) and the price elasticity with respect to 
pn is  -0.040 (.033). If we drop the price variable pn, the result is the second regression 
presented in Table 4. This regression shows that the estimates of the remaining three 
coefficients are hardly changed.  The high government revenue elasticity and the low 
GDP elasticity are reasonable since the government provides much of the higher 
education in China, in contrast with secondary and primary school education which 
  12depend to a larger extent on non-government funding or local government funding both 
of which are a function of local GDP.  The magnitude of the government revenue 
elasticity 1.264 is close to the cross-section estimate 1.292 of income elasticity insofar as 
provincial per capita income at one point in time is highly correlated with provincial 
government revenue per capita. The low price elasticity with respect to pg  shows that in 
providing higher education the government is not very sensitive to price and it is of the 
same order of magnitude as the price elasticities of demand for secondary and primary 
school education. The even lower and perhaps insignificant elasticity respect to pn shows 
that the price which the non-government sector has to pay for higher education has little 
effect on demand for higher education. 
 
Table 4 Demand functions for Higher Education 
 









Constant Adjusted  R 
square 
            
Coefficient 1.264499  -.3099243  .1987756 -.0401371  8.089801  0.9959 
Standard 
Error 
.0628039 .0896898  .0271588  .0332141 .793086   
          
Coefficient 1.216068  -.2946543  .1996815   7.526407  0.9956 
Standard 
Error 
.0497254 .0913141  .0279186    .6597799   
 
We next provide a check on the possible inconsistency of the estimates of price 
elasticities for secondary school and for primary school education previously obtained, as 
shown in Table 3, by regressing log price on income-adjusted log quantity by performing 
the regressions in the opposite direction as given below. 
 
[log(enrolls/popsec)-0.81*log(y/totpop)]= 6.683 -0.071 lnpgs       Adj R
2 = 0.1549 
                                  (.052)   (.04) 
 
[log(enrollp/popprim)-0.42*log(y/totpop)] = 3.675 – 0.1685lnpgp      Adj R
2  =0.5725 
(0.31) (0.042) 
 
The price elasticities of demand are –0.071 and –0.1685 respectively for secondary and 
primary school education, as compared with -0.3079 and -0.2756 reported previously in 
Table 3. The regressions of the log of income-adjusted quantity on log price have yielded 
smaller (in absolute value) price elasticities as expected from regression theory.  
  
In summary we have found that for higher education, the government revenue elasticity 
of demand is about 1.3, and government revenue rather than GDP is the appropriate 
income variable since government is the main provider of higher education. The price 
elasticity with respect to government price is about -0.3. For secondary school education, 
we have estimated an income elasticity of 0.8095 and the associated price elasticity in the 
range of -.07 to -0.3079. For primary schools, the cross-section estimate of income 
  13elasticity is 0.4172 and the associated price elasticity is in the range -.1685 to -0.2756.  
 
4. Aggregate Demand for Education in China  
 
We wish to explain the large increase in the ratio of educational funding to GDP from 3.4 
percent in 1997 to 5.21 percent in 2002 by the factors affecting demand. In this section 
we use the framework of section 3 to explain total student enrollment in China. 
 
In (1), (2) and (3) below we regress respectively ln(real non-government appropriation 
for education/per capita), ln(real government appropriation per capita) and ln(total 
educational funding per capita on ln(real provincial income/capita) using cross-section 
data for 2002 on 30 provinces and municipalities with Beijing excluded because much 
educational expenditures allocated for Beijing was for higher education of non-residents . 
Data on provincial GDP in 2001 is found on China Statistical Yearbook 2002. Using 30 
provincial observations and after dividing both funding data and provincial GDP by 
provincial CPI indices we have estimated the following three equations. 
 
(1) ln(real nongov app/pop) = -4.697  + 1.1263ln(real GDP/pop),  Adj R=0.6897 
     (0.6115)  (0.1369) 
(2) ln(real gov app/pop)   = -2.302 + 0.7599 ln(real GDP/pop), Adj R=0.5855 
      (0.5153)  (0.1154) 
      (3) ln(total edu funding/pop) = -2.319 + 0.8552 ln(real GDP/pop),  Adj R=0.7231 
        (0.4288)  (0.096) 
         
Observe that the income elasticity of demand for education spending from non-
government appropriation estimated in regression (1) is slightly above unity and is higher 
than the elasticity of 0.7599 for government appropriation in (2) because government 
policy for education is intended to equalize funding in different regions by subsidizing 
the very poor regions. The estimated income elasticity of government demand in (2) is 
still substantial because the ability of local governments to fund education depends on 
their income levels.  We will use the estimate 0.8552 for income elasticity from 
regression (3) for the purpose of estimating the price elasticity of aggregate demand for 
education using time series data.  
                                                           
Table 2 contains the time series data employed that begin in 1991 partly because statistics 
for total expenditure pq before 1991 are not available. Furthermore the demand function 
might not be valid before 1991 as the market for education services might not be in 
equilibrium when entry of many new schools continued to occur in the late 1980s. Here q 
is quantity demanded per capita, defined as total student enrollment in all three levels of 
schools divided by total population, and p is total educational fund divided by q and by 
CPI. As in the case of studying demand for the three levels of education separately we 
regress log price on the log of income-adjusted quantity to obtain 
 
(4) lnp = -7.8996 -  2.184(lnQ-0.8552*ln(real GDP/pop),    Adjusted R=0.9132 
 (0.8553)    (0.2021) 
 
The estimated price elasticity is 1/2.184 = 0.4579. Regression in the opposition direction 
  14shown in equation (5) below gives a slightly smaller and very similar price elasticity of 
0.4218.  
 
(5) [lnQ-0.8552ln(real GDP/pop)] = -3.664-0.4218lnp,  Adjusted R=0.9132 
(0.0539)  (0.039) 
 
The low price elasticity is reasonable and is consistent with the low price elasticities of 
demand for primary and secondary school education estimated in section 3.  
Our objective is to explain total educational spending pq and the ratio pq/GDP, where p 
denotes the relative price of education, q denotes enrollment per capita and GDP denotes 
real GDP per capita. An equation for ln(pq) can be obtained by a demand equation for lnq 
plus lnp. The log of the ratio pq/GDP can be obtained by the above equation for ln(pq) 
minus ln(GDP), as given by 
 
[ln(pq) - ln(GDP)]  =  -(1-a)ln(GDP) + (1-b)ln(p)   
 
This equation shows that if income elasticity  a is above unity and price elasticity b is 
below unity, the ratio of education spending to GDP will increase as income increase 
since the first term on the right hand side will have a positive effect and the increase in 
price resulting from an increase in demand will also assert a positive effect through the 
second term. The equation can explain the increase in the ratio for developing countries 
even if the income elasticity is slightly below unity for the price effect of the second term 
may dominate, given a low price elasticity of demand for education. To put this point in 
simple terms, in the course of economic development as the income effect shifts the 
demand for education upward and as a slow increase in the supply of education causes 
the relative price of education services to go up, a price-inelastic demand for education 
will lead to an increase in the total expenditure on education. The above equation states 
that the price effect will also lead to an increase in the ratio of education spending to 
GDP unless the income elasticity is much below unity and the negative income effect 
dominates the positive price effect. 
 
We estimate this equation using annual time series data alone from 1991 to 2002 to 
obtain  
 
(6) [ln(pq)-ln(GDP)] = -2.64 -0.6688ln(GDP) + 0.925lnp,    Adj. R= 0.9791 
                     (0.218) (0.1105)            (0.0764)     
 
which implies a= 1-.6688 =0.3312 and b= 1-0.925 = 0.075. Both estimates are much 
smaller than the corresponding estimates 0.8552 and 0.4579 or 0.4218 obtained by 
combining cross-section and time-series data, for the reason given in section 3 before the 
beginning of the time-series analysis. Equation (6) has a high adjusted R sq =0.9791 and 
can explain the estimated ratio of education spending to GDP well as shown in Figure 2 




Observed and Predicted values of log(Education Expenditure/GDP) 































































In Figure 2, edugdp is the log of the observed ratio of education expenditure to GDP, yhat 
is the predicted value from equation (6), and compred is the predicted value by imposing 
the income elasticity 0.8522 and price elasticity -.42 that were estimated by combining 
cross-section and time series data, after adjusting for a constant term. The rising trend in 
the log of the ratio of education expenditure to GDP can be explained well even after we 
impose the income elasticity of 0.8522 but there is overestimation of the log ratio in the 
years 1993 to 1997. 
 
Based on the equations  
 
lnp =1/b(c+alnGDP-lnq), and therefore 
      ln(pq/GDP)=(1/b)c+(a/b-1)lnGDP+(1-1/b)lnq 
 
we can also regress ln(pq/GDP) on lnGDP and lnq (rather than lnp as done previously) to 
derive the price and income elasticities: 
 
(7)   [ln(pq)-ln(GDP)] = -5.75 +0.6789lnGDP –0.2899lnq,   Adj. R= 0.9791 
                (3.236)  (0.3265)        (1.314)      
 
 
Given 1-1/b=-0.2899, we find the price elasticity  b=0.755; and given a/b-1=0.6789, we 
find the income elasticity a  = 1.6789*0.755=1.3, both are higher than 0.4182 and 0.8552 
estimated by combining cross-section and time-series estimates with the adjusted log 
quantity as the dependent variable, and much higher than 0.075 and 0.3312 estimated 
from time series data alone and using lnGDP and lnp as regressors. If we impose the 
income elasticity .8552 from cross section and allow the time series to determine only the 
price elasticity from the nonlinear regression of ln(pq/y) on (1/b)c+(0.8552/b-
1)lnGDP+(1-1/b)lnq, we obtain an estimated coefficient of b equal to 0.4579 with a 
  16standard error of 0.04. In Figure 3 we compare the actual log (education 
expenditure/GDP) ratio with the fitted values of (1) regressing ln(pq/y) on lnp and lnGDP 
as shown previously in Figure 2 and denoted by predlnplny, (2) regressing ln(pq/y) on 
lnq and lnGDP, denoted by predlnqlny and (3) the nonlinear regression of ln(pq/y) on 
lnGDP and lnq, imposing a =0.8552.  
 


































































The main conclusions from the regressions shown in Figures 2 and 3 are as follows. First 
the regression (6) of the log of income-adjusted quantity on log GDP and log price gives 
the best fit and can trace the observed ratio of education expenditure to GDP well but 
yield very low income and price elasticities which perhaps can be interpreted as short-run 
elasticities. Second, the regressions of log price on log GDP and log income-adjusted 
quantity give higher income and price elasticities but fit the data not as well, although the 
general increasing trend of the ratio is captured. Third, imposing the income elasticity of 
0.8522 does not affect substantially the goodness of fit of the regression of log price on 
log GDP and log income-adjusted quantity but affect the goodness of fit of the regression 
of log quantity on log GDP and log price since the latter income elasticity is small as 
estimated by time series data alone. Since none of the above regressions give both 
reasonable elasticities and a very good fit of the data, we propose to decompose the 
aggregate demand for education into the two components of government and non-
government demand following the idea in section 3 for higher education. However there 
is one difference. In section 3 we have explained expenditures on higher education by 
two sets of income and price variables, one set from government demand and the second 
set from non-government demand. In this section, we decompose the quantity demanded 
itself, or the expenditure on education, into two components that result from government 
  17and non-government demand. The reason for doing so in this section is the need to 
explain the ratios of government and non-government spending to GDP which is a main 
purpose of this paper.  
  
Let “total educational funds” be divided into “government” and “non-government” or the 
remainder, where “government” is defined as the “budgetary” part of “government 
appropriation.” The above method of analysis for the aggregate will be applied to each of 
the two components separately, except that government revenue is the relevant income 
variable for the government component of demand Qg and GDP is the appropriate income 
variable for the non-government component Qn. Low case letters denote the 
corresponding per capita figures. 
 
We first estimate the revenue elasticity of demand for the government component using 
30 provincial observations for 2001 by regressing real provincial government spending 
per capita on real provincial government revenue per capita, and similarly for the non-
government component except for the use of provincial GDP in place of provincial 
government revenue. For government spending per capita, the result is  
 




For non-government spending per capita with provincial GDP per capita as the income 
variable we find  
 




The higher income elasticity for the non-government component as compared with the 
government revenue elasticity for the government component is consistent with the 
income elasticities in equations (1) and (2) where government is defined as government 
appropriation rather than government budgetary expenditure.  
 
Given a government revenue elasticity of 0.6143 for the government component of 
demand, and an income elasticity of 1.119 for the non-government, we estimate the price 




[ln(qg *p) – 0.6143*ln(Gov rev)] = 3.5499 + 0.4315 lnp and     Adj R
2 = 0.9773.   
(0.27) (0.432) 
 
Using time-series data alone, we obtain 
 
(8)  ln(qg*p /Gov rev) = 0.8475 -0.6631 Gov rev + 0.711 lnp,          Adj R
2 =  0.8493 
      (0.869) (0.089)         (0.091) 
 
which yields a government revenue elasticity of (1-0.6631) = 0.3369 and a price elasticity 
  18of (1-0.711) = 0.299, both lower than the respective estimates 0.6143 and (1-
0.4315)=0.5685 based on combining cross-section and time-series for the reason 
discussed in section 3.  
 
For the non-government sector with GDP replacing government revenue, we have 
 
[ln(Qn*p) -1.119ln(real GDP/pop)]= -5.20 + 0.5377 lnp ,        Adj R
2=0.9036. 
   (0.073) (0.0527) 
 
Given income elasticity of 1.119, price elasticity estimated by time series is (1- 0.5377) = 
0.4623 for non-government spending. Using time-series data alone we obtain 
 
[ln(Qn*p) -ln(real GDP/pop)]= -5.367 + 0.2041 lnrgdp+0.4814 lnp,   Adj R
2=0.9179 
(0.5476)  (0.2776)     (0.1918) 
 
which yields an income elasticity of (1-0.204)= 0.796 and price elasticity of (1-0.4814) = 
0.5186, both of the same order of magnitude as the estimates obtained by combining 
cross-section and time series data.  
 
Figure 4 The Ratio of Non-gov Spending on education Qn*p to GDP  































































If we want to explain the ratio of gov spending on education Qg*p to GDP we have to 
convert (8) to  
 
(9)       [ln(Qg*p /gdp) - a1*ln(Gov rev)]= const – ln(real GDP/pop) +(1-b1) lnP  
 
The estimated regression is 
 
[ln(Qg*p /gdp) – 0.6143*ln(Gov rev)]= 3.4136 -0.9302 ln(real GDP/pop) +0.3854 lnp  
            (0.202) (0.1022)                              (0.0706) 
  19, Adj. R-squared = 0.95. 
 
The above equation predicts [ln(Qg*p /gdp) well, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 The Ratio of Gov Spending on Education Qg*P to GDP  





























































Government policy can affect education funding not only by increasing its own 
appropriation for education but also by encouraging the local governments and private 
sector to spend more on education. This may have happened in 1998-2002 but the above 
demand analysis does not resort to a change in government policy and is able to explain 
the increase in the ratio of education funding to GDP through its two components. We 
have found that using government revenue as the income variable enables us to explain 
the ratio government spending to GDP well. The government revenue elasticity of the 
government component aggregate demand for education is lower than in the case of the 
government demand for higher education, as expected, but the explanatory power for the 
ratio of education spending to GDP is excellent as Figure 5 shows. 
 
In summary we have succeeded in explaining the increase in total education spending as 
a fraction of GDP from 3.4 percent in 1997 to 5.23 percent in 2002 by the factors 
affecting demand. By considering the log of total spending on education as the dependent 
variable we have found an income elasticity of 0.86; 0.76 for government spending and 
1.13 for non-government spending where government spending is defined by government 
appropriation and non-government as the remainder. Given the income elasticity of 0.86. 
we have estimated a price elasticity of -0.42 to -0.46. The framework explains very well 
total student enrollment and the ratio of total education spending to GDP. By dividing 
total educational spending into the government (budgetary) and non-government 
component, with the government component determined by government revenue rather 
  20than GDP we can explain the ratio of each component to GDP very well. Our framework 
implies that total expenditure on education can increase rapidly with rising income 
because of the positive income effect (from government revenue and/or GDP) and of the 
price effect (with a low price elasticity of demand and an increase in price). 
 
5. Implications for Income Inequality  
 
We first compare the standard deviation of log education expenditure across provinces 
with the standard deviation of the log of real GDP across provinces. Since income 
elasticity is less than one, the former is expected to be smaller than the latter but not 
much smaller. Since income elasticity of demand for education is close to one (0.8522) 
income inequality has led to education inequality. Non-government spending has income 
elasticity larger than unity that makes inequality in education opportunities greater than 
inequality in income. Given an income elasticity of demand of 0.6 for government 
spending, the government fails to equalize education expenditure among the rich and the 
poor although it lessens the degree of inequality of education opportunities as compared 
with income inequality. 
 
Concerning inequality in education spending on the three school levels, since income 
elasticity is higher for higher education than for secondary and primary schools, being 
1.29 as compared with 0.81 and 0.42 respectively, inequality in income generates a lower 
degree of inequality in lower level education than in higher education. With an income 
elasticity of 0.42 for primary school, the poor receives primary school education to a 
larger extent than their income allows. In other words, there is a tendency to equalize 
primary school education among people of different income levels but not completely.  
 
The use of provincial data to estimate income elasticity of demand for primary school 
education may obscure the fact that some very well to do families may be spending 
proportionally more on sending their children to very good primary schools. This would 
have an effect on increasing educational spending inequality even for primary schools. 
Even if this is the case, the situation may not be considered undesirable if one believes 
that the government’s main responsibility is to provide a basic level of income for 
necessities to the poor who cannot afford them otherwise, and not to prevent the rich 
from spending money to benefit their family members. In brief, China has a substantial 
degree of income inequality and, given income elasticity of demand for primary school 
education to be 0.42 and for secondary schools education to be 0.81, the effects of 
income inequality on education inequality are substantial. Such effects will persist as 
long as the degree of income inequality continues to be large.  
 
Regional income disparity, as measured by the standard deviation of log (provincial 
consumption per capita) for a cross-section of provinces, has increased from 0.47 in year 
1990 to 0.5568 in year 2003. The measure of inequality would increase if we used rural 
income per capita rather than total income per capita among provinces since disparity in 
urban income per capita among provinces is less than in rural income per capita. With an 
income elasticity of demand for education of about 0.8552 an increase in income 
inequality leads to an increase in inequality in education opportunities also. 
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In discussing income inequality we recognize that increasing inequality is not necessarily 
bad, although poverty is. Inequality can be the result of having more talented people on 
top and/or more opportunities for the very talented while the economic wellbeing of the 
poor people improves more slowly. More income inequality can result when people with 
high income can afford better education for themselves and their children. The effects of 
private tuition on inequality across generations is discussed in Heckman (2004). Less 
income inequality may occur in the long run when the educated are able to increase 
income per capita and to help the poor. A poor country cannot devote enough resources 
to help the poor or to develop the Western region in the case of China. One indication of 
the rich having more opportunities is reflected in the income elasticity of non-government 
demand for education being larger than unity as reported. 
 
In China, the income elasticity of demand for higher education is large (approximately 
1.29) and the income elasticity of demand for primary school education is low 
(approximately 0.42). This is consistent with the finding of UNESCO (2002, p.48) that  
China spends much more on a student at college level relative to GNP per capita as 
compared with other countries and less per student in the primary education level. The 
higher income elasticity at the college level reflects the government’s desire to make 
some Chinese universities world class (as explicitly stated in policy statements by top 
education officials like former Vice Premier Li Lanqing) and to develop science and 
technology by educating the elite. This policy helps to create more inequality but may 




The main conclusions of the paper can be summarized as follows. 
 
First, although China’s education system is under the direction of the government, it is 
guided by market forces to a large extent. The fraction of non-government education 
funding (defined as total spending minus government budgetary spending) has been 
increasing in recent years and has risen to about 50 percent in 2002.  
 
Second, from an institutional point of view non-government funding can take a variety of 
forms. It can take place in public schools which collect fees, or which are operated by 
non-government organizations or individuals through some form of leasing arrangement. 
Some schools are privately owned and operated by non-government professional 
associations or by a collection of individuals. In all cases the driving force is market 
oriented because the operation of a school is guided by its financial considerations.  
 
Third, the development of privately financed or privately operated educational 
institutions illustrate one important aspect of China’s economic transformation into a 
market economy. While the government maintains an important role in many sectors in 
the economy, including the industrial, financial, transportation and communication, and 
education sectors, it has allowed and encouraged the development of non-government 
institutions in these sectors. It is often the latter that was the driving force of economic 
  22growth and development in an environment of free entry and competition.  
 
Fourth, as compared with the parents in the United States the Chinese parents have more 
choices of schools for their children. They are not subject to paying a real estate tax to 
finance the usually only local public school available to their children, as the Chinese 
schools are financed party by general tax revenue and partly by tuition. There are several 
public and private schools available to most urban families. The schools are not obliged 
to accept any student below the standard they set, and thus have different academic 
standards. 
 
Fifth, the framework of demand analysis is applicable to explain the spending on 
education, with real income and relative price as the major explanatory variables. 
 
Sixth, when primary school, secondary school and higher education are studied 
separately we find income elasticity to be 0.42 for primary school and 0.81 for secondary 
school and government revenue elasticity to be 1.264 for higher education. The price 
elasticities are respectively 0.2756, 0.3079 and 0.31 with the price paid by the 
government as the appropriate variable in the demand for higher education.  
 
Seventh, when total enrollment of all three levels of schools combined is studied by 
decomposing total demand into the government (budgetary) and non-government 
components, we find a government revenue elasticity of 0.6143 and a price elasticity of 
0.5685 for the government component and an income elasticity of 1.119 and a price 
elasticity of 0.4623 for the non-government component.  
 
Eighth, our framework can explain the ratio of education expenditures to GDP very well. 
The increase in this ratio from 3.38 in 1991 to 5.21 in 2002 can be explained by the 
increase in real GDP which raised demand. Given an inelastic supply of education 
services, this resulted in a large increase in price. Since demand is price inelastic, total 
spending increased as price increased. This mechanism can explain the increase in the 
ratio of education spending to GDP in other developing countries as well. Hence one 
should be careful in criticizing the government for an observed low ratio of education 
spending to GDP without studying the influence of market forces on this ratio. 
 
Ninth, on the relation between income inequality and education inequality, to the extent 
that the demand for education is affected by income, income inequality will be reflected 
in education inequality. Since the income elasticity of total education spending by the 
government is below unity, the government has helped to equalize educational 
opportunities among the rich and poor to some extent, as compared with the situation 
with all education spending being private (which has a higher income elasticity). For 
primary school education, the income elasticity is low. Hence education opportunities are 
more equalized in primary schools than in secondary schools and higher education. Yet 
inequality remains even for primary schools. 
 
Tenth, the Chinese government places a strong emphasis on developing world class 
universities and has spent a large amount on higher education, as reflected in a large 
  23government revenue elasticity of government demand for higher education. In the mean 
time it has a policy of compulsory education for nine years but many children aged 
fifteen or below do not receive the required education because the central government has 
given the responsibility for providing it to provincial and local governments which resort 
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